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I

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

TERRY LYNNE JONES,
Plaintiff-Appellant
vs.

Case No. 16525

WILLIAM K. HINKLE and
KATHRYN P. HINKLE,
Defendants-Respondents.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for damages and for specific performance
of certain provisions in a uniform real estate contract.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The lower court granted Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment and denied Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment,
granting Defendants an award of attorney fees and holding
that in spite of a contract provision stating

that when the

principal due under the contract was reduced to the amount of
outstanding loans and mortgages secured or maintained by Sellers
that Sellers agreed to convey and Buyers agreed to accept
title to the property subject to the loans and mortgages,
Sellers had no obligation to convey and Buyer had no right to
obtain title even if Buyer had paid the principal balance down
to an amount equaling

the balance owing on the outstanding
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obligation to Deseret Federal Savings and Loan.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-Appellant seeks to have the decision of the
lower court reversed, vacating the Summary Judgment and award
of attorney fees granted to Defendant and to have the case remanded for entry of Judgment and award of attorney fees on
behalf of Plaintiff-Appellant.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts giving rise to the case are as follows:

On or

about May 12, 1977 Plaintiff and Defendants executed and entered into an installment real estate contract.
standard form

Unifor~

(TR.

38)

A

Real Estate Contract blank (form 106

which states that it has been approved by the Utah Securities
Administration and the Utah State Board of Realtors) was used
in setting forth the terms of contract,

(TR. 13)

said form contract were changed or deleted.

No terms in

(TR. 13)

The

property is residential in nature and is located in Utah
County, Utah.

(TR. 13)

The essential terms, other than parties and description,
specific to this transaction are found in paragraphs 3, 4, 6,
8, 9, and 21, as follows:
3. Said Buyer hereby agrees to enter into
possession and pay for said described premises
the sum of Sixty five thousand and no/100--Dollars ($65,000.00) payable at the office of
Seller, his assigns or order strictly within
the following times, to-wit: Twenty five thousand and no/100--- ($25,000.00) cash, the receipt
of which is hereby acknowledged, and the balance
of $40,000.00 shall be paid as follows:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Three hundred thirteen dollars and sixty cents
or more on or before the 12th day of June and
Three hundred thirteen dollars and sixty cents
on or before the 12th day of each month thereafter until contract balance is paid in full,
together with all interest accrued and in addition Buyer to make one balloon payment in the
amount of $8,163.22 (Eight thousand one hundred
sixty-three and twenty-two cents) on or before
May 12, 1978. Said payment to include !/12th of
property taxes and l/12 of hazard insurance
monthly.
If taxes and insurance increase,
monthly payments to be adjusted accordingly.
The buyers shall pay interest on the balloon
payment of 9 1/2 interest until paid in full.
Possession of said premises shall be delivered
to buyer on the 12th day of May, 1977.
4. Said monthly payments are to be applied
first to the payment of interest and second to
the reduction of the principal.
Interest shall
be charged from May 12, 1977 on all unpaid portions of the purchase price at the rate of nine
& one-half percent (9 1/2%) per annum.
The Buyer
at his option at anytime, may pay amounts in excess of the monthly payments upon the unpaid balance subject to the limitations of any mortgage
or contract by the Buyer herein assumed, such
excess to be applied either to unpaid principal
or in prepayment of future installments at the
election of the buyer, which election must be
able at the time the excess payment is made.

6.
It is understood that there presently exists
an obligation against said property in favor of
Deseret Federal Savings and Loan with an unpald
balance of $31,836.78, as of May 1, 1977.

8.
The Seller is given the option to secure,
execute and malntain loans secured by said property
of not to exceed the then unpaid contract balance
hereunder, bearlng interest at the rate of not to
exceed nine (9%) percent per annum and payable in
regular monthly installments; provided that the
aggregate monthly installment payments required to
be made by Seller on said loans shall not be
greater than each installment payment required to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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be made by the Buyer under this contract. When
theprincipal due hereunder has been reduced~
the amount of any such loans and mort a es the
Sel er agrees to convey and the Buyer agrees to
accept title to the above described property subJect to sa1d loans and mortgages.
9.
If the Buyer desires to exercise his right
through accelerated payments under this agreement
to pay off any obligations outstanding at date of
this agreement against said property, it shall be
the Buyer's obligation to assume and pay any penalty
which may be required on prepayment of said prior
obligations. Prepayment penalties in respect to
obligations against said property incurred by Seller,
after date of this agreement, shall be paid by seller
unless said obligations are assumed or approved by
buyer.

21.
The Buyer and Seller each agree that should
they default in any of the covenants or agreements
contained herein, that the defaulting party shall
pay all costs and expenses, including a reasonable
attorney's fee, which may arise or accrue from enforcing this agreement, or in obtaining possession
of the premises covered hereby, or in pursuing any
remedy provided hereunder or by the statutes of the
State of Utah whether such remedy is pursued by
filing a suit or otherwise. (TR. 13 emphasis added)
On or about July 1, 1978 Plaintiff contacted Defendants
directly and explained that she had reduced the principal balance to the amount of the Deseret Federal Savings and Loan
obligation, had made arrangements with that institution to
assume that loan, and requested that Defendants transfer title
to her pursuant to paragraph 8 of the contract.

(TR.

51, 52)

As of that date Plaintiff had made payments reducing the unpaid balance on said contract to the sum of $31,368.40 which
was equal to or less than the amount owing on the Deseret
Federal Savings and Loan obligation which was created prior
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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to Plaintiff's purchase of the property, existing as set forth
in paragraphs 6 and 8 of the contract and which was the only
outstanding obligation against the property.

(TR. 51)

Defen-

dants refused and failed to transfer title to the property.
(TR. 52)

Because of Defendants failure to transfer title at

that time Plaintiff is presently unable to assume said obligation without incurring much higher interest expenses.

(TR. 52)

Subsequent to said refusal and since the filing of this lawsuit
Defendants by affidavit of Kathryn P. Hinkle have admitted
that paragraph 8 of the Uniform Real Estate Contract provides
that buyer (Plaintiff) has a right to undertake the principal
mortgage held by seller (Defendants) and allege generally for
the first time that certain terms and conditions precedent to
transfer remained unfulfilled.

(TR. 44)

Defendants have further admitted receipt of payments
made pursuant to the contract as follows:
6/30/77

$313.65

7/10/77

313.60

8/10/77

313.60

9/6/77

313.60

10/12/77

313.60

11/8/77

313.60

12/8/77

313.60

l/20/78

338.60

2/10/78

338.60

3/6/78

338.60
8,863.33

4/11/7()

(balloon payment)
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5/30/78

$338.60

6/12/78

338.65

7/78

338.60

8/78

338.60

9/78

338.60

10/78

338.60

11/78

338.60

12/78

338.60

1/79

338.60

2/79

347.60

(TR. 38, 39)
Plaintiff continued to make payments on said property
as they became due.

(TR. 52)

It is Defendant's position as set forth in the affidavit
of Kathryn P. Hinkle that Plaintiff has nothing to gain in
effecting said title transfer and that Defendants stand to
loose a sum in excess of $4,000.00 because the rate of interest that Plaintiff pays Defendants according to the contract
is less than the rate of interest Defendants pay on the obligation to Deseret Federal Savings and Loan.

(TR. 45) .

Plaintiff brought this action November 1, 1978 by filing
a complaint alleging that the conditions of the contract
found in paragraph 8 with respect to reduction of the principa
balance and assumption of outstanding obligations had been
complied with; that demand for conveyance had been made upon
Defendants; that Defendants failed and refused to transfer
the property; that Plaintiff is entitled to specific perform-
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ance and damages caused to her by delay of Defendants.

Defen-

dants answered the complaint denying that Defendants had any
obligation to convey title to the property and alleging that
the terms of paragraph 8 of the contract excluded from their
application the Deseret Federal Savings and Loan obligation
which was set forth as an existing obligation in paragraph
6 of the contract.

Defendants generally denied the remain-

ing essential elements of Plaintiff's claim and counterclaimed
for attorney fees.

Plaintiff replied to the counterclaim deny-

ing Defendants' claim for attorney fees.
Defendants answered Plaintiff's requests for admissions
April ll, 1979 and filed a Motion for Summary Judgment supported
by the affidavits of Howard J. Swapp and Kathryn P. Hinkle on
May 2, 1979.
May 15, 1979 Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment
supported by the affidavit of Terry Lynne Jones.
May 17, 1979 the court heard both motions, denying Plaintiff's motion, granting Defendants' motion and awarding an
attorney fee to Defendants.
May 22, 1979 Plaintiff filed a Motion to Reconsider which
was denied by the court on June l, 1979.
ISSUES
1.

The district court erred in interpreting the contract

to state that Plaintiff had no right to assume the obligation
set forth in paragraph 6 of the contract pursuant to the terms
of paragraph 8.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services
and Technology
Act, administered
the Utah State
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2.
The district
court
should
haveby held
that
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to the terms of the contract Plaintiff has an absolute right
to assume the obligation set forth in paragraph 6 of the contract when the terms of paragraph 8 are fulfilled.

3.

Defendants are liable for any damages to Plaintiff

caused by their refusal to transfer title according to the
terms of the contract.
4.

The district court erred in awarding Defendants an

attorney fee based upon paragraph 21 of the contract because
as a condition precedent to the award of attorney fees a finding must be made that a party is in default in a covenant or
agreement contained in the contract.
5.

The district court should have awarded Plaintiff an

attorney fee based upon paragraph 21 of the contract.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT HAD NO RIGHT TO ASSUME
THE UNDERLYING OBLIGATION ON THE REAL PROPERTY.
The contract specifically gives Plaintiff, as buyer, the
right to have seller convey title to the property at such time
as the principal due on the contract is reduced to the amount
outstanding on any loans and mortgages secured or maintained
by Seller on the property pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 8 of the contract, including the Deseret Federal Savings
and Loan mortgage specifically identified in paragraph 6.

In

the lower court Defendants argued,apparently pursuading the
court,that the provisions of paragraph 8 of the contract respecting Buyer's right to have Seller convey title to her do
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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not apply to the oeseret Federal Savings and Loan mortgage
maintained by Defendants as set forth in paragraph 6.
Plaintiff contends and stated by affidavit that the
conditions specified in paragraph 8 of the contract had been
complied with and that therefore she had a right to have
Defendants convey title to the property to her.
Defendants through the affidavit of Kathryn P. Hinkle
admit Plaintiff's right to title but generally deny that the
conditions precedent had been met.

This presents a genuine

issue as to material facts, on its face precluding summary
judgment,

(see discussion under Point II, Supra.)

Yet the

court ruled as a matter of law that Plaintiff had no right
to have title conveyed to her under any circumstances.

This

conclusion flies in the face of the clear language of the
contract which this court can determine as the trial court
could without being bound by the trial court's conclusion.
Kier v. Condrack, 24 U.2d 139, 478 P.2d 327, (1970).
man v. Potter, No. 16004,

Hart-

(Utah, filed June l, 1979).

Paragraph 6 of the contract sets forth the fact of the
existing Deseret Federal Savings and Loan obligation against
the property.

Paragraph 8 specifically authorizes Seller to

secure, execute and maintain loans against the property under
certain conditions.

By the principle of ejusdem generis it is

understood that the loans referred to in paragraph 8 are of
the same type and kind as the loan specifically referred to
previously.
Paragraph 8 then goes on to state:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"When the principal due hereunder has been
reduced to the amount of any such loans and
mortgages the Seller agrees to convey and the
Buyer agrees to accept title to the above
described property subject to said loans and
mortgages",
Blacks Law Dictionary defines "Ejusdem Generis" as follows:
In the construction of laws, wills, and other
instruments, the "ejusdem generis rule" is, that
where general words follow an enumeration of
persons or things, by words of a particular
and specific meaning, such general words are
not to be construed in their wildest extent, but
are to be held as applying only to persons or
things of the same general kind or class as those
specifically mentioned.
. The rule, however,
does not necessarily require that the general
provision be limited in its scope to the identical things specifically named. Blacks Law Dictionary, West Publishing Company, 4th Edition.
p.
608, 1951.

The contract in question specified the Deseret Federal
Savings and Loan obligation in paragraph 6, identifying for
buyer the true state of the title to the property.

Paragraph

7 states respecting the title that there are no unpaid special
improvement taxes on the property.

Paragraph 8 then authorizes

Seller to secure, execute and maintain loans and mortgages
secured by the property, i.e. obligations of the same kind and
including the one discussed in the preceding section.

Seller

is specifically authorized to maintain that loan, subject to
Seller's agreement to convey and Buyer's agreement to accept
title when the amount that Buyer owes on the contract is
equal to the amount Seller owes on obligations secured by
the property.

To exclude the principal obligation against

the property from the operation of this clause would mean that
Buyer might have to accept title to the property while Seller
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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still had the benefit of a $30,000.00 loan secured by property
now in Buyer's name, which Buyer would stand to loose in the
event of Seller's default on the obligation.

Such a construe-

tion would be contrary to the overall terms of the instrument
and the obvious intent of the parties.
It is Plaintiff's position that the contract means what
it says.

It is apparently Defendants' position that the contract

means something else.

Although neither party has claimed that

the contract is ambiguous, the respective positions of the
parties imply that the court need interpret the contract.

Hart-

man v. Potter, supra.
The basic rules for contract interpretation have been set
forth by the Utah Supreme Court:
"This intent should be ascertained first from
the four corners of the instrument itself,
second from other contemporaneous writings
concerning the same subject matter, and third
from the extrinsic parol evidence of the intentions." Continental Bank and Trust Company
v. Bybee, 6 U.2d 98, 306 P.2d 773, (1957).
Examination of the instrument itself shows in paragraph 3
that the payment schedule contains an exactly calculated balloon
payment in the amount of $8,163.22 to be made on or before May
12, 1978.

This payment was calculated by Defendants, who drafted

the document, to reduce the principal balance of the contract
to an amount exactly equaling

the balance payable to Deseret

Federal Savings and Loan at that time.

This was to facilitate

the intent of the parties at the time the contract was drafted,
namely that Plaintiff would assume the Deseret Federal Savings
and Loan obligation at that time and Defendants would convey
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title to the property to Plaintiff.

( TR. 28, 53)

The pay-

ment schedule supports Plaintiff's contention that Defendants
have breached the contract in failing to convey title to the
property to Plaintiff.
In

additio~

paragraph 9 of the instrument sets forth

additional options for buyer to accelerate conveyance of the
property.
The Uniform Real Estate Contract by its terms supports
Plaintiff's contention that Buyer had a right to have Sellers
convey title to her pursuant to the terms of paragraph 8.

The

issue of whether or not the provisions of paragraph 8 were met
by Plaintiff was not considered by the lower court although
raised by both parties.
No contemporaneous writings of the parties were
into evidence before the lower court.

introduc~

Parol evidence was sub-

mitted by both parties in the form of affidavits.

Plaintiff's

affidavit supports her contention that she had a right to conveyance from Defendants and specifically asserts that all
conditions precedent were performed by her.

The affidavit

of

Kathryn P. Hinkle also supports Plaintiff's contention that
she has a right to conveyance but generally denies performance
of the conditions precedent.
"3.
That paragraph 8 provides that buyer
may undertake the principal mortgage held
by the seller under certain terms and conditions and that none of the terms and conditions required were fulfilled herein, and,
therefore, buyers have no right, under paragraph 8, to assume Seller's mortgage." ( TR.
4 4' 4 5) •
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Under the standard set by this court in Continental Bank
and Trust Co., supra, all of the evidence supports Plaintiff's
position that she had a right to have the property conveyed to
her and the evidence, which of course should be viewed in the
light most favorable to Plaintiff, raises a most material
question of fact concerning the performance of the conditions
set forth in paragraph 8 of the contract.
It is elemental that the result be as intended by the
parties and that neither party obtain an unfair advantage by
varying the terms of the contract.

TO deprive Plaintiff of

her right to have title conveyed to her would create such a
situation which this court handled in the case of Kier v. Condrack, supra,
We recognize the validity of the rule relied
upon by the defendants that to be enforceable
a contract must be sufficiently definite in its
terms that the parties know what is required of
them. But like all rules, which are necessarily
stated in generality, it is only applicable in
the proper circumstances, where the justice of
the case requires: as a shield to protect a
party from an injustice and not as a weapon with
which to perpetrate an injustice . . . . when the
parties had reached agreement and committed themselves on the major aspects of the transaction,
that is, that the defendants would sell and the
plaintiff would buy at the agreed price of $23,500,
if the plaintiff exercised the option within the
time specified, reserving only the "terms" of
payment, they should be obliged to act in good
faith in keeping their promise. It would seem
inequitable and unjust to permit a seller to
simply refuse unreasoningly to justify his refusal .
. . . neither party should be permitted to use the
reservation of •terms" to get more than they had
promised: the plaintiff to get more land, or the
defendants to get more money. nor either to renege
on the bargain.
. p. 142, 143
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The court should interpret the contract to reflect the
intent of the parties and the intent is shown as set forth
above to the effect that Plaintiff was entitled to conveyance
of title from Defendants upon demand and when the conditions
precedent of paragraph 8 were performed.

Continental Bank

and Trust Company, supra, Kier v. Condrack, supra., Oregon
Shortline Railroad Company v. Idaho Stockyard Co., 124 U. 2d 205,
365 P.2d 826,

(1961).

Plaintiff simply submits that the contract language
should be given its usual and ordinary meaning, and that the
entire body of the contract and the subsequent acts of the
parties support that meaning.
460,

Daly v. Old, 35 Utah 74, 99 Pac.,

( 1909).
POINT II
IT WAS IMPROPER TO GRANT DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
Summary judgment for Defendants as granted by the lower

court was improper and contrary to Rule 56(c) U.R.C.P. and
the large body of opinion supplementing that rule.
In a case very similar to the instant case, Sandberg v.
Klein, 576 P.2d 1291,

(Utah, 1978)

the Plaintiff sued to have

an option to purchase real property declared expired and the
Defendant alleged full performance of all conditions.

The

matter was submitted to the court by motion and affidavit,
upon which the trial court entered findings, conclusions and
judgment in favor of the Plaintiff.

The Supreme Court revers~,

relying on 1) performance of the parties,

2)

the equivocal acto
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of the parties and 3) the need to resolve questions of the
intent of the parties holding:
A summary judgment can only be granted under
Rule 56(c), U.R.C.P., when it is shown there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact,
and the moving party is entitled to judgment,
as a matter of law, under the operative facts.
The court cannot consider the weight of testimony or the credibility of witnesses in considering a motion for summary judgment. Herein
although the parties were not in complete conflict as to certain facts, the understanding,
intention, and consequences of those facts
were vigorously disputed. These matters can
only be resolved by a trial. p. 1291

There are basic unresolved issues which
prevent a summary judgment.
In the case of Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191,

(Utah,

1975), this court held:
It only takes one sworn statement under
oath to dispute the averments on the other
side of the controversy and create an issue
of fact. .
. if there is any dispute as
to any issue, material to the settlement of
the controversy, the summary judgment should
not be granted. p. 193
This is the case in the instant matter.

The lower court

improperly granted Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.
Plaintiff submits that the court holding in Western Pacific
Transport Co. v. Beehive State Agricultural Co-op, No. 16056,
(Utah, filed June 26, 1979) is also applicable to this case.
We are entirely cognizant of the advantages
of the summary judgment procedure in saving
the time, effort and expense of a trial when
it clearly appears that there areno disputed
issues of material facts and the court can
therefore rule for the moving party as a matter
of law. However, the granting of such a motion
fails of that objective, and the hoped for advantages are not only lost, but there actually reSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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sults a greater expenditure of time and effort
if there are such disputed issues to be resolved
and the granting of such a motion is not justified.
From what has been set forth above, it
should be plain that in this case there are such
disputed issues which ought to be tried.
The
motion was improperly granted and it is necessary
that the case be remanded for trial. Costs to
appellant (defendant).
POINT III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AWARDING
ATTORNEY'S FEES TO THE DEFENDANT
AND NOT TO THE PLAINTIFF.
The lower court awarded attorney fees to Defendants pursuant to paragraph 21 of the contract.

Said paragraph states:

21. The Buyer and Seller each agree that
should they default in any of the covenants or
agreements contained herein, that the defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses,
including a reasonable attorney's fee, which
may arise or accrue from enforcing this agreement, or in obtaining possession of the premises
covered hereby, or in pursuing any remedy provided hereunder or by the statutes of the State
of Utah whether such remedy is pursued by filing
a suit or otherwise.
Said clause provides for payment of attorney fees arising
from default in the terms or covenants of the contract.
It is undisputed that Plaintiff is not now and has never
been in default under the terms of the agreement.

Defendanto

have had no need to enforce the agreement and it does not
follow that Defendants be awarded attorney fees.
No finding was made by the court that Plaintiff was in
default on the contract or that Defendants had any need to
enforce the agreement, indeed no averments were made or
affidavits submitted in support of any such allegation.
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Defendants are in default under the terms of paragraph
8 of the contract for having refused to convey title and
Plaintiff should be awarded an attorney fee for bringing
this action.
CONCLUSION
It is clear from the terms of the contract, the parties
actions and the applicable law that the lower court's entry
of summary judgment should be reversed as well as the lower
court's award of attorney fees, Plaintiff has a right to conveyance of title under the contract and this matter should be
remanded for trial on the issues of condition precedent to
conveyance and damages.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

zs-- day

of September, 1979.

L. Henriod
Steph n L. Henriod
NIELSEN, HENRIOD, GOTTFREDSON & PECK
Attorneys for Plaintiff
400 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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